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Introduction
Agriculture is a source of food and nutrition, and raw 
materials for industry. The sector accounts for 4 per cent of 
global gross domestic product (GDP) and in some develop-
ing countries, contributes more than 25% of GDP (World 
Bank, 2020). Growth in the sector is between two and four 
times more effective in increasing wealth among the poor-
est compared to other sectors. It is understood that in 2016, 
65% of poor working adults made a living through agricul-
ture (World Bank, 2020). Therefore, developing agriculture 
is one of the most potent tools to terminate extreme poverty, 
enhance shared prosperity and feed a projected 9.7 billion 
people by 2050 (World Bank, 2020). Global investment needs 
(domestic and foreign direct investment) are in the range of 
$5 trillion to $7 trillion per year. Estimates for investment 
needs in developing countries alone range from $3.3 trillion 
to $4.5 trillion per year, mainly for basic infrastructure, and 
food security, among others (United Nations, 2014). Thus, 
investments including foreign direct investment are required 
to support the agricultural sector.
Therefore, governments globally have pursued mac-
roeconomic policies to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI). This is an investment made by an enterprise dwell-
ing in one economy in order to attract lasting attention to an 
enterprise that is dwelling in another economy (Punthakey, 
2020; UNCTAD, 2020; United Nations, 2015). “Lasting 
attention” in this regard suggests the presence of a long-
term association between the direct investor and the direct 
investment enterprise that exerts a substantial influence on 
the leadership of the enterprise. This substantial influence is 
evidenced by domestic investors typically possessing 10% 
or more of the voting power of a direct investment enter-
prise (UNCTAD, 2020). Inward FDI is important for a range 
of reasons. Firstly, inward FDI enhances local investment 
by increasing domestic investment via connections in the 
production value-chain; this occurs when foreign firms buy 
locally made inputs or when foreign firms supply transitional 
inputs to local firms. Secondly, the FDI supplements the sup-
ply of funds for investment, a situation that fosters capital 
formation. Thirdly, inward FDI increases the host countries’ 
ability to export, initiating a rise in foreign exchange earn-
ings. Finally, new job openings, and improved technology 
transfer are both related to FDI, thereby augmenting overall 
economic growth (de Mello Jr., 1997; Gallova, 2011; Kim 
and Seo, 2003; Mileva, 2008; Oualy, 2019; Romer, 1992). 
These benefits notwithstanding, there is evidence that for-
eign divestment (FD) does occur after FDI. Foreign divest-
ment is a strategic decision of foreign firms in a host country 
that results in changes in their business portfolio, ultimately 
leading to a reduction in the level of assets. The divestment 
could be downsizing, relocation of operations or termina-
tion (Benito, 2005; Belderbos and Zou, 2006; Boddewyn, 
1983a; Chung et al., 2010; Nyuur and Debrah, 2014). Nyuur 
and Debrah (2014) explained downsizing as partial sale or 
disposal of physical and organisational assets and the reduc-
tion of workforces of the organisation. Relocation entails the 
complete shutdown of facilities and moving these facilities 
and the foreign firms’ operations to another country (Belder-
bos and Zou, 2006; McDermott, 2010; Nyuur and Debrah, 
2014). Finally, termination involves the complete sale or 
disposal of physical and organisational assets, shutdown of 
facilities, and foreign firms’ operations in a country without 
relocating to another country (Nyuur and Debrah, 2014). The 
assets of the subsidiary are usually repatriated back to the 
headquarters (Nyuur and Debrah, 2014). Irrespective of the 
form, FD does reduce the stock of FDI and total domestic 
investment in the host country, leading to loss of jobs, tax 
revenue, and foreign exchange and depriving the host econ-
omy of other benefits accruing from FDI. Taking all this into 
consideration, it is important to identify the causal factors of 
FD in agriculture and the direction of the effects. 
Some studies have addressed the drivers of FDI into 
agriculture (Djokoto, 2012a; Farr, 2017; Husman and Kubik, 
2019; Kassem and Awad, 2012; Lv et al., 2010; Rashid and 
Razak, 2017) but not FD. This paper uses multilateral FD 
data covering 1991 to 2017 for 50 countries. The paper 
focuses on agriculture globally. Identifying the factors that 
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determine FD would afford an opportunity for policymak-
ers to understand what kind of policies can discourage FD. 
Also, knowledge of the directional effect would offer a way 
for policymakers to use policy to appropriately influence 
FD. This is relevant as FD reduces not only FDI stock, but it 
also reduces the total investment stock, which is key to eco-
nomic growth in the agricultural sector as well as the wider 
economy.    
This paper is organised in five sections. A review of the 
literature follows next. Section three presents the model and 
data. The results of the analysis and discussion of same are 




In the literature, theories of FD have been conceptualised 
as barriers to exit within the industrial-organisation perspec-
tive (Boddewyn, 1983b; Porter, 1976; Wilson, 1980) and as 
a managerial dimension with a specific focus on what fac-
tors cause FD (Boddewyn, 1983a,b ; Spanhel and Johnson, 
1982; Spanhel and Boddewyn, 1983). Boddewyn (1983b, 
p346) succinctly notes “These managerial studies have gen-
erally focussed on the deliberate and voluntary reduction 
or elimination of actively controlled foreign subsidiaries 
and branches through sale or liquidation, thereby excluding 
nationalizations, expropriations, spin-offs, ‘fade-out’ and 
‘harvest’ cases as well as passive subsidiaries”. Viewing 
FD theory as the reverse of Dunning’s eclectic theory, Bod-
dewyn (1983b) notes three preconditions for FD. The firm:
1. ceases to possess net competitive advantages over 
firms of other nationalities.
2. no longer finds it beneficial to use them itself rather 
than sell or rent them to foreign firms - that is, the firm 
no longer considers it profitable to ‘internalise’ these 
advantages.
3. no longer finds it profitable to utilise its internalised 
net competitive advantage outside its home country – 
that is, it is now more advantageous to serve foreign 
markets by home production, and/or to abandon for-
eign markets altogether. 
The internationalisation theory of Hymer (1976) notes 
that firms often prefer FDI to licence as a strategy for enter-
ing a foreign market. The oligopolistic industries theory 
of Knickerbocker (1973) posits that firms follow others in 
entering foreign markets. Firms undertake FDI at stages in 
the life cycle of the product they pioneered (Vernon, 1966). 
Foreign markets are accessed when local demand in those 
countries grows sufficiently to support local production. 
These theories of FDI can work in the reverse for FD. 
Empirical review
As studies on the drivers of FD from agriculture are 
non-existent, the empirical review addresses the drivers of 
FDI. The existing literature focused on an individual country 
(Ghana - Djokoto, 2012a; Egypt - Kassem and Awad, 2012; 
China - Lv et al., 2010) and country groups (Africa - Hus-
mann and Kubik, 2019; Latin America - Farr, 2017; Organi-
sation of Islamic Countries (OIC) - Rashid and Razak, 2017). 
The size of the agricultural economy (market size) influences 
FDI into agriculture (Farr, 2017; Husmann and Kubik, 2019; 
Kassem and Awad, 2012; Lv et al., 2010; Rashid and Razak, 
2017). However, while Kassem and Awad (2012) found that 
the exchange rate determined FDI, Djokoto (2012a) and 
Rashid and Razak (2017) found a neutral effect. Openness to 
trade determines FDI overall (Farr, 2017) although Djokoto 
(2012a) found a positive but statistically insignificant effect 
of trade openness on FDI into agriculture. Some have con-
cluded that access to land resources significantly determines 
FDI into agriculture (Farr, 2017; Husmann and Kubik, 2019; 
Rashid and Razak, 2017). However, Djokoto (2012a) found 
the contrary. The effect of inflationary pressures on FDI into 
agriculture has been mixed. Whilst Djokoto (2012a) found 
a positive effect, Kassem and Awad (2012) reported a nega-
tive effect. Lastly, Djokoto (2012a) found that political open-
ness promoted FDI into agriculture. Combining theory and 
empirical evidence, market size, exchange rate, inflation, 
land, and political openness can be said to determine FDI.     
Modelling and Data 
Owing to the non-existent literature on the drivers of FD 
in agriculture, the starting point of the model building is the 
drivers of FDI derived from theoretical and optimisation pro-
cedures. This is further justified as the work of Boddewyn 
(1979a,b, 1983a,b, 1985) have shown that the theories of 
foreign divestment are the reverse of the theories of FDI. 
For example, consider a multinational enterprise (MNE) 
faced with a cost function for both domestic and foreign pro-
duction plants. The MNE would decide whether to expand 
production domestically and export to a foreign market or 
instead to invest directly in a foreign market (Hymer, 1976; 
Vernon, 1966). The MNE would thus seek to minimise the 
cost of production for the two plants. Let C denote the total 
cost, ωd and ωf the unit costs in domestic plants and foreign 
plants, respectively, and Qd and Qf to be the respective quan-
tities produced in each plant. Then,
 (1)
Unit costs in both plants are therefore a function of the 
quantity produced. The production of the two plants should 
not exceed  given by:
 (2)
In line with production theory, cost should be minimised, 
hence the setup of the Lagrangian.
 
(3)
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Taking first-order partial derivative of 3 with respect to 











 and  are assumed to be 
positive.
From the above, output in the foreign firm is positively 
related to the total demand  and differences in unit costs. 
Consequently, the foreign plant increases its production pro-
vided ωd > ωf. On the other hand, the firm will expand pro-
duction in its domestic plant, resulting in a reduction in the 
output produced in its foreign plant provided ωd < ωf. Thus 
far, the desired output is established. The next thing to do is 
decide on the levels of inputs to be used for the production in 
the foreign firm. For the sake of brevity, two inputs are 
assumed: labour, L and capital, K. Let w and k be wage rate 
and cost of capital, respectively. Then, the cost of producing 
the Qf denoted as Cf  is: 
 (8)
As the subsequent derivation relates to the foreign firm 
(production), the subscript, f is dropped. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function: 
 (9)
the Lagrangian is set up as in equation 10. Unlike in 
equation 4, the constraint here is the production function.
 (10)
Taking first-order partial derivatives with respect to w, k 











Therefore, K is positively related to total demand (sum 
of domestic and foreign demand) and negatively related to 
the unit costs of foreign costs relative to domestic costs. As 
the focus is on the foreign firm of the MNE, the capital is 
largely or entirely, FDI. Thus, K can be replaced with FDI 
in equation (14). Based on the theories of FDI (Dunning, 
1977, 1988, 1993, 2001; Hymer, 1976; Knickerbocker, 
1973; Vernon, 1966) and the empirical evidence for agricul-
ture (Djokoto, 2012a; Farr, 2017; Husman and Kubik, 2019; 
Kassem and Awad, 2012; Lv, et al., 2010; Rashid and Razak, 
2017) and the total economy (Harding and Javorcik, 2007; 
Morisset, 2003; Barthel et al., 2008; Djokoto, 2012b; Dah 
and Khadijah, 2010; Nyarko et al., 2011), the function for 
the drivers of FDI is:
 
(15)
The variables, their definitions and data source are 
reported in Table 1. 
As Boddewyn (1979a,b, 1983a,b, 1985) has amply dem-
onstrated that the theories that explain FDI are the reverse of 
those for FD, equation (15) is underpinned by the theories of 
FD. As will soon be shown, the data employed in this study 
has two important distinguishing characteristics; it is made 
up of countries at different levels of development, and there 
are repeated observations for some countries but different 
years, yet the structure of the data is not such as to qualify 
as a panel. As such, it is necessary to control for these. Thus, 
additional variables are introduced into equation (15) and 
defined in Table 1. According to UNCTAD (2020), negative 
FDI is FD. As the focus of the study is FD, the AGFDI can 






Table 1: Variable definitions, measures, and sources of data.
Variable Definition and measure Measurement Source
LNAGFD Foreign divestment Negative of foreign direct investment into agriculture FAOSTAT
LNAGGDPPC Agricultural Gross domestic per capita Agricultural Gross domestic product in current prices divided by population FAOSTAT
LNEXRATE Nominal Exchange rate Local currency to 1 US dollar UNCTADSTAT, WDI
LNAGTO Agricultural trade openness Sum of agricultural exports and exports to agricultural GDP FAOSTAT
LNAGLAND Proportion of agricultural land in country land area
Ratio of agricultural land to total  
country land area FAOSTAT
INF Inflation Annual growth rate of consumer price index UNCTADSTAT, WDI
POLITY2 Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions -10 to +10 Centre for Systematic Peace
DVP Developing countries DVP=1, 0 otherwise -
TRS Transition economies TRS=1, 0 otherwise -
DVD Developed countries DVD=0 -
LNYEAR Year of data Four-digit year -
Notes: 1. The prefix LN denotes natural logarithm. 2. FAOSTAT- Food and Agricultural Organisation statistics centre: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/. 3. UNCTADSTAT – United 
Nations Conference of Trade and Development Data centre: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/. 4. WDI – World Development Indicators of the World Bank: https://databank.
worldbank.org/home.aspx. 5. Centre for Systematic Peace: https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html   
Source: own composition
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Explained variable(s)
FD 0.0071 0.0259 4.50e-06 0.3000
LNFD -6.631 1.8617 -12.3113 -1.2038
Explanatory variables
Theoretical variables
GDPPC 665.2623 1,261.6060 15.2965 10,252.8200
LNGDPPC 6.0505 0.8186 2.7276 9.2353
EXRATE 339.9892 1,233.2330 0.0568 10,389.9400
LNEXRATE 1.9037 2.6770 -2.8678 9.2486
AGTO 7.6797 26.1065 0.0317 247.5623
LNAGTO 1.0715 1.2773 -3.4510 5.5117
AGLAND 0.4047 0.1729 0.0109 0.8491
LNAGLAND -1.0450 0.6357 -4.5215 -0.1636
Economic and political controls
INF 4.6757 8.1377 -0.9222 74.3000
POLITY2 8.4220 3.2638 -6 10
Data controls
DVP 0.2775 0.4490 0 1
TRS 0.0405 0.1976 0 1
DVD 0.6821 0.4670 0 1
YEAR 2004.751 6.4350 1991 2017
LNYEAR 7.6033 0.0032 7.5964 7.6094
Note: The prefix LN denotes natural logarithm.  
Source: own composition




Where the prefix LN stands for natural logarithm. The 
data used in this study is made up of 50 countries across all 
three levels of development according to the United Nations 
(2020) (Appendix). As the data is not strictly a panel, equa-
tion (16) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
having controlled for the repeated observations using the 
year of observation. Violations of the OLS namely, hetero-
scedasticity, multicollinearity and misspecifications were 
tested. 




The data ranged from 1991 to 2017 (YEAR) and repre-
sented observations of countries for which FDI is negative 
(Table 2). This is the singular driver of the number of coun-
tries and years of the data. The FD ranged from 4.50e-06 
(Republic of Korea in 2000) to 30% (Belgium in 2005). The 
maximum is appreciable; indeed, the penultimate highest is 
12% (Singapore in 2004), less than half of the maximum. 
The mean of 0.71% coincides with the value for Lithuania 
in 2015. The least AGGPPC of $15.29/person was for Sin-
gapore in 2004 and the maximum of $10,252/person relates 
to Panama in 2009. Thus, distributing agricultural produc-
tion by the national population, Singapore gets the least 
whilst Panama gets the highest. Regarding local currency 
relative to the US dollar, it was least expensive to acquire 
$1 using Venezuela’s Bolívar in 1991 (Bs 0.0568) and most 
expensive to acquire $1 in Indonesian Rupiah (Rp 10,390) in 
2009. INF and POLITY2 both recorded negative values. The 
latter shows a low level of democracy and political toler-
ance (Morocco - 2005, 2008 and Kazakhstan - 2004, 2007). 
The negative values in the two series prevented their natural 
logarithm transformation. Regarding the other data controls, 
most of the countries that experienced FD in agriculture over 
the study period are developed countries, 68% (28 countries) 
and the least is economies in transition, 4% (3 countries).
Results from the estimations
The estimations, model 1 to 8, are reported in Table 3. 
Model 1 is the outcome of estimation with the theoretical 
variables only. The model appeared to be incorrectly speci-
fied with the statistical significance of the Ramsey RESET 
test (Ramsey, 1969) measured at 1%. Upon correcting for the 
misspecification by including a square term of the prediction 
of LNFD (LNFD1SQ), the adjusted R squared doubled but 
the highest VIF exceeded the threshold of 10, a result that is 
indicative of multicollinearity. Furthermore, the variance of 
model 2 became heteroscedastic (Breusch and Pagan 1979; 
Table 3: Estimation results.
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LNGDPPC -0.5914*** -8.3519*** -0.6252*** -9.3453*** -0.6268*** -9.6426*** -0.5375** -0.5230**
(0.1953) (1.9695) (0.2097) (2.1453) (0.2103) (2.1853) (0.2106) (0.2209)
LNEXRATE -0.1297** -1.7976*** -0.1273** -1.8412*** -0.1323** -1.9753*** -0.1946*** -0.1943***
(0.0640) (0.4258) (0.0644) (0.4243) (0.0659) (0.4493) (0.0713) (0.0716)
LNAGTO 0.0331 0.5494*** 0.0273 0.4936*** 0.0324 0.5931*** 0.2091 0.2209
(0.1425) (0.1889) (0.1434) (0.1785) (0.1444) (0.1932) (0.1607) (0.1694)
LNAGLAND 0.1066 2.0277*** 0.0989 1.9609*** 0.0875 1.8223*** 0.0579 0.0568
(0.2221) (0.5300) (0.2233) (0.5036) (0.2259) (0.4710) (0.2276) (0.2283)
LNFD1SQ 0.9719***
(0.2455)
POLITY2 0.0209 0.3434*** 0.0295 0.4904*** 0.1353** 0.1347**
(0.0465) (0.0906) (0.0520) (0.1218) (0.0658) (0.0660)
LNFD2SQ 1.0224***
(0.2504)
INF 0.0077 0.1233*** 0.0113 0.0109









Constant -2.7298** 5.8056** -2.7074** 6.7523** -2.8140** 5.3604** -4.7618*** 74.1650
(1.3433) (2.5119) (1.3474) (2.6512) (1.3802) (2.3724) (1.5643) (350.1924)
Model diagnostics
Observations 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173
R-squared 0.0959 0.1735 0.0970 0.1794 0.0978 0.1828 0.1334 0.1336
R-squared Adjusted 0.0744 0.1487 0.07 0.1498 0.0652 0.1482 0.0911 0.0858
F- statistic 4.46*** 7.01*** 3.59*** 6.05***  3.00*** 5.27*** 3.15*** 2.79***
Highest VIF 1.78 216.55 1.79 229.98 1.81 239.13 2.79 2.83
Breusch-Pagan test 2.46 5.16** 2.29 3.55* 2.03 3.76* 0.03 0.01
Ramsey RESET test 5.4*** - 6.15*** - 6.34*** - 2.25* 2.20*




ability of resources. Thus, the decrease in market size would 
discourage FDI and invariably encourage FD.          
The negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
LNEXRATE means that depreciation of the country local cur-
rency by 1% would induce 0.19% decrease in FD. Owing to 
concessions for imports for MNEs, they tend to import mate-
rials including raw materials. Depreciation of the country’s 
currency would make the imports more expensive. Also, this 
could lead to an increase in other imported goods, leading 
to an increased cost of living. This could drive up wages. 
Generally, the increased cost of production could diminish 
profits and encourage FD out of agriculture. This finding 
is consistent with Kassem and Awad (2012) with regard to 
the significance of the coefficient. Whilst the exchange rate 
promoted FDI, the price of the currency discouraged FD. 
Djokoto (2012a) and Rashid and Razak (2017) however, 
found no effect of exchange rate on FDI.
Openness to trade is positive but statistically insignifi-
cant. This is consistent with the findings of Djokoto (2012b) 
but at variance with the conclusions of Farr (2017) and Kas-
sem and Awad (2012). As the exchange rate depreciates, 
although exports become cheaper, imports become more 
expensive. MNEs in agriculture that depend on imported 
raw materials would face high costs. They would thus, fail 
to reap the benefits of cheaper exports. The interaction of the 
exports and imports would, therefore, have no discernible 
effect on FD. 
In theory, location resources should determine FDI and 
for that matter FD. The findings of this study, however, 
show that access to land resources does not have a discern-
ible effect of FD. Although consistent with Djokoto (2012a), 
the finding disagrees with Farr (2017), Husmann and Kubik, 
(2019) and Rashid and Razak (2017). The measure of land 
used in this study is agricultural land use as a proportion of 
total country land. Not only does this reflect agricultural land 
use in the country, but it also captures land grab influences 
on agriculture (Byerlee et al., 2015; Deming, 2012; Escresa, 
2014; Fraser, 2019). Divestments that involve transfers of 
capital leaving control of land resources or transfer of land 
to domestic or other MNEs could account for the statistically 
insignificant effect.
Increase in POLITY2 variable by 1% would induce 
0.1347% rise in FD. Although this is not an encouraging out-
come, it is to be expected. Improvements in political regime 
characteristics and transitions promote FDI into agriculture 
(Djokoto, 2012a). This is often associated with investment 
laws that guarantee the security of investment. Just as these 
attract FDI into the sector, the same window offers an oppor-
tunity to MNE’s affiliates in host countries to divest if or 
when it becomes necessary. The consolation, however, is 
that the agricultural sector of the host economy would have 
attracted FDI and reaped the benefits therefrom before the 
FD. Moreover, between the period of 1991 to 2017, the 
FAOSTAT reported 984 instances of FDI (positive) whilst 
the occurrences of FD number 173 (less than 20% of the 
FDI). Further, the instances of FD did not mean there was no 
FDI, rather the FD was more than the FDI. 
The positive sign of the coefficient of INF suggests as 
inflation worsens FD increases. This is not surprising as Kas-
sem and Awad (2012) reported worsening inflation drove 
Cook and Weisberg, 1983). In model 3, with the inclusion 
of POLITY2, there was misspecification and the subsequent 
correction created a new multicollinearity problem (VIF = 
229.98) (Model 4) (Cuthbert and Wood, 1980). On adding 
INF, model 5 is also incorrectly specified and correcting 
for this also led to above 10 threshold VIF of 239.13. It is 
instructive to note that the corrections for the misspecifica-
tion always created a multicollinearity problem. The mis-
specification correction variable then gives rise to another 
problem whose most appropriate resolution would require 
dropping the correction variable. 
To get out of the dilemma, the data controls were added. 
First, the levels of development (Model 7). Second, is the 
year control variable (LNYEAR) as in model 8. Whilst 
producing statistically significant F statistics, the VIFs are 
below 3.00 and no evidence of heteroscedasticity. Based on 
a cut-off of 5%, models 7 and 8 are not incorrectly specified. 
Thus, they do not violate the assumptions of the OLS hence 
appropriate for discussion. The difference between model 7 
and 8 is the introduction of LNYEAR that drove the statistical 
significance of the constant (model 7) to statistical insignifi-
cance (model 8). 
Using model 8, the statistical significance and sign of the 
coefficients of LNGDPPC and LNEXTRATE  are consistent 
across all eight models. The magnitude and sign of the coef-
ficients of LNAGTO and LAGLAND are consistent across 
the models not corrected for misspecification. The sign and 
statistical significance of the magnitude of POLITY 2 are 
consistent for four out of six models. That for inflation is 
consistent for three out of the four models containing INF. 
The sign and statistical significance of the magnitude of the 
development controls are also consistent in model 7 and 8. 
It is worth noting that the F statistics are statistically sig-
nificant. These imply that the explanatory variables jointly 
explain the variability in the explained variable. However, 
the adjusted R squared values of model 7 and 8 are small, 
about 10%. As the R-squared represents the scatter around 
the regression line, the low R squared shows a wide vari-
ation around the trend line. This does not, however, vitiate 
the relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
explained variable which is the focus of the paper.
Discussion of drivers of foreign divestment
The statistically significant coefficient of -0.5230 for 
LNGDPPC suggests a 1% decrease in LNGDPPC would 
increase FD by 0.5230%. It would be observed that the mag-
nitude of 0.5230 is the largest among the coefficients of the 
theoretical, macroeconomic and political controls. Thus, not 
only is market size a driver of FD, but it is also the single 
most important theoretical driver of FD. This finding is syn-
onymous with those for FDI. Just as market size increased 
with FDI (Djokoto, 2012a; Farr, 2017; Husmann and Kubik, 
2019; Kassem and Awad, 2012; Lv et al., 2010; Rashid and 
Razak, 2017), market size increased with the decline in 
FD. Increase in market size affords the sector’s economic 
agents to purchase the products of the sector. This is further 
enhanced by households from other sectors as agriculture 
remains the most important provider of food. Increase in the 
size of the sector is also associated with the increased avail-
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down FDI. Djokoto (2012a) however, reported a positive 
effect of inflation on FDI in Ghana and explained that the 
generally high inflationary environment was accommodated 
by FDI. Moreover, other drivers are known to have stronger 
effects on FDI than inflation. In the case of the current study, 
the magnitude of the coefficient of the INF is statistically 
insignificant. 
The development controls show statistically significant 
coefficients. The magnitude of TRS is more elastic than that 
of DVP. Whilst these suggest TRS experienced more FD 
than DVP, the sum of the outcome is that developing coun-
tries and transition economies experienced FD more than 
developed countries. This seemed to depart from the uni-
variate position that most developing countries experienced 
FD because other variables have now been accounted for. 
Indeed, developed countries tended to be more stable politi-
cally than developing and transition economies. Moreover, 
although agriculture becomes less and less important as its 
shares to total GDP decline, the size of the sector continues 
to be large. A combination of the transition process and some 
instability within the three transition countries could have 
accounted for the higher elasticity. 
Although not statistically significant, the coefficient of 
LNYEAR is negative. This presents a situation of decline in 
FD over time, which is encouraging. This is to be expected 
as the size of the agricultural economies of countries tends to 
increase over time.
Concluding remarks
This paper used multilateral FD data covering 1991 to 
2017 for 50 countries to estimate the drivers of agricultural 
FD. Identifying the factors that determine FD would offer 
an opportunity for policymakers to know the policies that 
can discourage FD. Also, knowledge of its directional effect 
would suggest ways to use policy to appropriately influ-
ence FD. It has been found that market size, exchange rate, 
political regime characteristics and transitions as well as a 
country’s level of development drive FD out of agriculture 
globally. However, a country’s openness to trade and access 
to land resources have not been found to determine FD. 
As market size was measured as GDP per person, agri-
cultural economic managers acting together with Central 
Government should formulate policies to control their coun-
try’s population as increased technology adoption is lead-
ing to increased unemployment in the agricultural sector. 
A declining population would increase the size of GDP per 
capita ceteris paribus. Agricultural GDP should be increased 
through increasing domestic and foreign investment. The use 
of such policy tools should increase the size of the economy 
and decrease FD from the sector.
There is also a need to manage foreign currency exchange 
rates in order to reduce the cost of acquiring the US dollar 
within bounds that would not unduly discourage essential 
imports whilst simultaneously facilitating exports from the 
sector. Policymakers need to balance consideration of the 
effects of exchange rate movements on the agricultural sec-
tor with those of the wider economy as the exchange rate 
affects all other sectors.   
Notwithstanding the positive effects political regime 
characteristics and political transitions have been shown to 
have in relation to FD, political regime characteristics should 
be enhanced as the benefits to the sector in terms of FDI out-
weigh the effects of FD. As developed countries have tended 
to experience less FD than developing and transition econo-
mies, these less advanced countries must redouble their 
efforts as they push on towards becoming developed coun-
tries themselves. This would require, among other things, 
increasing efficiency in the agricultural sector through 
appropriate and improved technology, as well as measures 
such as expanding the non-agricultural sector to absorb the 
resultant excess labour. Generally, increasing the share of the 
non-agricultural sector feeds into the structural transforma-
tion narrative of economic development. Although the model 
discussed fits the data despite the low adjusted R squared, 
future studies could usefully employ machine learning; this 
could improve the model fit.
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Appendix 1: List of countries in the sample.
Developing Developed
Bolivia Madagascar Uruguay Australia France Netherlands
Cambodia Malaysia Venezuela Austria Germany Poland
Chile Morocco Transition Belgium Greece Romania
Colombia Mozambique Albania Bulgaria Iceland Slovakia
Costa Rica Panama Kazakhstan Croatia Italy Slovenia
El Salvador Paraguay North Macedonia Cyprus Japan Spain
Honduras Rep. of Korea Czechia Latvia Sweden
Indonesia Singapore Denmark Lithuania UK 
Israel Thailand Estonia Malta USA
Source: own composition
